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Matching and the Allocation of 
Indivisible Objects via Deferred-
Acceptance under Responsive 
Priorities
It is well-known that economics is the science of allocating scarce resources. Often this is done using money as our 
daily shopping routines confirm. Sometimes, there is more to the allocation mechanism than simple price setting 
and taking, but even auction mechanisms as encountered on e-bay are now well accepted rationing mechanisms.
However, there are economic problems in which using money and prices to match resources and consumers is 
not usually done or is considered immoral or even illegal. Examples for this type of problems are the assignments 
of students to public schools or universities or the assignment of transplant organs to patients who urgently need 
these transplants. If money cannot or should not be used to determine who gets what, how else can we decide on 
matching resources to consumers1?
by: Bettina Klaus
Matching Practice: the National Resident 
Matching Program (NRMP)2
A by now famous and classic example of two-sided 
matching is the National Resident Matching Program 
(NRMP): a centralized clearing house to assign medical 
students to so-called intern or residency positions after 
their M.D. Degree. As with many entry-level jobs, work 
conditions and salaries are not very flexible and therefore 
do not play any role in the matching process.
The NRMP was established in 1952 because of 
persisting problems in the assignment of residents to 
hospitals. First, between 1900 and 1945, the medical 
resident market was decentralized and experienced 
unraveling of appointment dates – in an attempt 
to compete for the best students, hospitals offered 
residencies to medical students earlier and earlier up to 
a point when in 1945 positions were offered two years 
in advance of graduation. This led to some inefficiency 
in the matching. Second,when medical schools tried to 
control unraveling by not releasing information about 
candidates before a specified date that they all agreed on, 
the practice of exploding offers (extremely short decision 
times to accept offers) again destabilized the market 
(through missed as well as broken agreements). The 
original NRMP matching algorithm introduced in 1952 
as well as the redesigned NRMP matching algorithm 
introduced in 1998 are based on the so-called deferred 
acceptance algorithm that I will explain next.
Matching Theory and Deferred Accep-
tance3
In 1962 two game theorists/mathematicians - David Gale 
and Lloyd Shapley - wrote a now famous paper about 
“College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”. The 
college admissions model exactly captures the situation 
for medical residents (but the college admissions model 
was formulated by Gale and Shapley, 1962, independently 
of the NRMP): a set of students (medical residents) has to 
be assigned to a set of colleges (hospitals with residency 
programs). The ingredients of a college admissions 
1 A recent survey on these types of  markets is Sönmez and 
Ünver (2009).
2 For a detailed discussion of  the American medical interns/
residents market I refer to Roth (1984,2003).
3 I strongly recommend Gale and Shapley's (1962) seminal 
paper – simply beautiful!
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problem are as follows:
•  a set of students,
• a set of colleges each with a quota, i.e., the maximal 
number of students it can admit,
•  students strict preferences over colleges (including the 
option to not go to college),
•  and colleges' responsive preferences over sets of 
students.
Responsiveness means that colleges' preferences over sets 
of students are based on a strict ranking of the students 
that the college has (e.g., based on an entrance exam). For 
simplicity, I assume that all students are acceptable (they 
pass the minimal entrance requirements for all colleges). 
Then, a college's preference relation is responsive if it 
would like to add a student if its quota is not exhausted 
and if it would prefer to exchange one of its students for 
a better student in case the quota is already met.
A solution to a colleges admissions problem is a 
matching of students to colleges such that each student 
gets assigned at most one college and such that colleges' 
quotas are respected. A matching is stable, if no student 
is assigned to a college (s)he does not want to go to 
(individual rationality) and there is no blocking by a 
student-college pair such that the student prefers the 
college to the current match and the college also would 
like to add the student (either because the quota is not 
exhausted or because the college would then not admit a 
less preferred student). Stability is not only a theoretically 
appealing property, it plays an important role in entry-
level job-matching since an unstable matching is not 
likely to persist (it is too easy to check if there is a win-
win improvement for both sides of the market – you 
would definitely make a couple of phone calls to check 
if the employers you would prefer by chance would also 
prefer you before final hiring decisions are made).
However, given a college assignment or similar 
problem, do stable matchings always exist? And if 
they do, how do we find one? Gale and Shapley (1962) 
provided a simple and fast algorithm, called the student 
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, to compute a 
stable matching:
Step 1 for students: each student proposes to her\his 
favorite college.
Step 1 for colleges: each college tentatively assigns the 
best students who proposed to it without exceeding its 
quota (and rejects some students if too many propose).
Step 2 for students: each student currently not tentatively 
assigned proposes to her/his favorite college among those 
who have not yet rejected her/him. 
Steps 2 for colleges: each college tentatively assigns the 
best students who proposed to it and who were tentatively 
assigned without exceeding its quota (and rejects some 
students if too many propose).
Continue this procedure until all students are either 
tentatively assigned to a college or have exhausted their 
list of acceptable colleges. This algorithm produces a 
stable matching!
There is also a deferred acceptance algorithm where 
the colleges propose to students, but here I exclusively 
focus on the student proposing deferred acceptance 
algorithm, which has the following nice properties.
•  it finds a stable matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962);
•  it finds the best/optimal stable matching for all students 
(Gale and Shapley, 1962).
•  it is a weakly dominant strategy for all students to state 
their true preferences (Roth, 1985). In other words, a 
student cannot obtain a better match by lying about 
her/his preferences.
School Choice and Deferred Acceptance4
Some cities in the US operate so-called school choice 
programs in which students submit preferences about 
different district schools and based on “priorities” students 
are matched with schools. The school choice problem is 
very similar to the college admissions problem with the 
difference that schools' preferences over sets of students 
are replaced by priorities, i.e., rankings of students that 
might reflect objective priority criteria determined by the 
school district. In New York City, priorities at schools 
are determined by exam scores and in Boston aspects 
such as walking distance and siblings in the same school 
are taken into account. Both school systems exhibited 
signs of market failure and were redesigned using the 
student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm as main 
building block (see Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth, 
2005 a,b).
Allocating Indivisible Objects using Defer-
red-Acceptance
So far we have argued that deferred acceptance has nice 
theoretical properties for college admissions and school 
choice (note that preferences of colleges or priorities of 
schools are given). Furthermore, deferred acceptance 
emerged “naturally” as the mechanism of the NRMP 
clearinghouse and it was implemented in Boston and 
New York City’s school choice programs. Finally, I 
will demonstrate that deferred acceptance also has very 
nice and robust properties for allocation models without 
preferences or fixed priorities.
In Ehlers and Klaus (2009) we study the allocation of 
indivisible objects to a set of agents. The assignment of 
students to schools could be considered an example as 
well as the assignment of dormitory rooms to students. We 
assume that agents (e.g., students) in these situations have 
4 A recent survey on school choice is Klijn (2008).
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strict preferences over the (object) types (e.g., dormitory 
rooms of a certain type or in a certain building) and that 
(object) types might come with a capacity constraint (the 
maximal number of dormitory rooms of the same type). 
We have various results for this general class of allocation 
problems, but here – due to space limitations - I will only 
present one of our results for the class of problems where 
exactly one object of each type is available.
Our approach is to first define desirable properties that 
an allocation rule should satisfy and then see which class 
of rules satisfies all these properties.
We consider situations where resources may change, 
i.e., it could be that additional objects are available. When 
the change of the environment is exogenous, it would be 
unfair if the agents who were not responsible for this 
change were treated unequally. We apply this idea of 
solidarity and require that if additional resources become 
available, then all agents (weakly) gain. This requirement 
is called resource-monotonicity.
Next, we impose the mild efficiency requirement 
of weak non-wastefulness5 as well as the very basic 
and intuitive properties of individual rationality6 and 
unavailable object invariance7.
We also impose the invariance property truncation 
invariance8. Our last property is the well-known strategic 
robustness condition of strategy-proofness (which we 
mentioned before when stating that it is a weakly dominant 
strategy for students to state their true preferences when 
the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is 
used).
Assuming that an allocation rule satisfies all six 
elementary and intuitive properties described, we 
construct a priority structure of objects over agents. In 
other words, if an allocation rule satisfies all properties 
mentioned above, then any object is just like a college 
(with quota one due to our assumption that we have 
one object of each type) and has a priority ranking over 
agents. Thus, objects can be endowed with responsive 
preferences over agents and we can apply the agent 
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to obtain an 
assignment or matching of objects to agents. We call 
a rule that is based on the agents-proposing deferred-
acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities a 
responsive DA-rule. Not only can we construct a priority 
structure of objects over agents based on our properties, 
but the only allocation rule satisfying the properties is the 
DA-rule based on the constructed priority structure.
To summarize, we characterize the class of responsive 
DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, 
unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak 
non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation 
invariance, and strategy-proofness (Ehlers and Klaus, 
2009, Theorem 1). For further characterizations along 
this line (and technical details of the model, the properties 
etc.) we refer to Ehlers and Klaus (2009).
The main conclusion of Ehlers and Klaus (2009) is, 
that deferred acceptance also plays an important role 
for allocation problems that might not come in the form 
of a college admissions problem (where colleges have 
responsive preferences) or a school choice problem 
(where schools have fixed priorities over students). 
When allocating objects to agents, it might be necessary 
to assign pseudo (responsive) preferences or priorities 
to objects in order to guarantee the desirable properties 
mentioned above.
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